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Abstract
Traditional economic models typically treat pri-
vate information, or signals, as generated from
some underlying state. Recent work has ex-
plicated alternative models, where signals cor-
respond to interpretations of available informa-
tion. We show that the difference between these
formulations can be sharply cast in terms of
causal dependence structure, and employ graph-
ical models to illustrate the distinguishing char-
acteristics. The graphical representation supports
inferences about signal patterns in the interpreted
framework, and suggests how results based on
the generated model can be extended to more
general situations. Specific insights about bid-
ding games in classical auction mechanisms de-
rive from qualitative graphical models.
1 Introduction
In a game of incomplete information, we commonly dis-
tinguish the information available to respective agents
in terms of their epistemic types (henceforth just types).
Agents are assumed to know their own private types, and
have probabilistic beliefs about other-agent types. When
other-agent types are strategically relevant, our analyses
generally consider what agents can infer about others from
their own types, a possibility that arises only when types
are interdependent. Such interdependencies typically de-
rive from the way that the respective agents’ information
relates to some underlying state of the world, in which case
we may refer to an agent’s type as a signal about that state.
The treatment of signals is a central element of theoretical
analysis for many classes of multiagent interactions. In par-
ticular, signals play a pivotal role in formal models of auc-
tions, voting, and many other social mechanisms. Canon-
ical theoretical results about these problems take the form
of relating properties of the signal distributions to solutions
(e.g., equilibria) of the Bayesian games induced. For exam-
ple, celebrated theorems in the auction literature establish
revenue comparisons (ascending open outcry greater than
second-price sealed bid greater than first-price sealed bid)
under the assumption that signals are affiliated (a form of
monotone relation) [Milgrom and Weber, 1982].
Recent work by Hong and Page [2009] has shown that the
implications of signals on interacting agents varies quali-
tatively depending on whether they are viewed as caused
by payoff-relevant elements of the underlying state (gener-
ated) or as causal factors from a predictive model of the ob-
server (interpreted). Although both represent common pat-
terns of uncertain information, literature to date has tended
to emphasize the generated view.
We develop a graphical model framework for representing
the structure of signals in games of incomplete informa-
tion. We show that this representation can capture the key
structural distinctions between generated and interpreted
signals, and supports graphical inference to identify the rel-
evant patterns in complex information relationships. As a
modeling language, the approach also supports represen-
tation of complex games of information, and automated
game-theoretic inference about these games. Observa-
tions highlighted in the sections below show several ways
in which modeling the structure of signals supports gen-
eralized insights about classes of incomplete-information
games.
2 Representation of Information Structure
2.1 Bayesian Games
In a game of incomplete information, some strategically
relevant aspects of the game are not known to at least some
agents. To play or predict the result of such a game, it is es-
sential to model what private information agents have about
these uncertain aspects. In his seminal work, Harsanyi
[1967] used types to capture agents’ private information
and defined a game where agents’ payoff functions depend
on the types of all agents. It is assumed that each agent
knows her own type but not others. Her beliefs about other
agents’ types are given by a probability distribution over
possible types of other agents conditional on her own type.
Harsanyi called this a Bayesian game. The Bayesian game
formulation has since become the standard framework for
games of incomplete information.
The treatment of types in Bayesian games is useful and el-
egant, but provides no account of the origins of private in-
formation. That agents’ types may arbitrarily interdepend
serves generality, but may abstract away structure in how
they interdepend, which in turn may support qualitatively
significant distinctions. So how can we incorporate into
the framework where private information comes from? We
posit a set of underlying states of nature, Ω, such that all
relevant uncertainty can be captured in terms of which state
ω ∈ Ω obtains. This includes state relevant to payoff func-
tions (which we refer to as the outcome, v), as well as state
bearing on the production of types. Private information,
then, can be characterized as a signal providing evidence
about ω. From a particular agent i’s perspective, a signal
si drawn from its set of possible signals Si yields infor-
mation about the underlying state according to the joint
probability of signal and state, Pr(si;ω).1 The relation-
ship among the signals of N agents is captured by the joint
conditional distribution Pr(s;ω), where s = (s1, . . . , sN ).
One interesting case is conditional independence, defined
by the equality Pr(si | s−i;ω) = Pr(si | ω), where
s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN ) denotes the signals of
all agents other than i.
The goal of capturing structure in the origin of signals
is now reduced to capturing structure in a particular joint
probability distribution. For that we appeal to the formal-
ism of graphical models.
2.2 Graphical Models
Probabilistic graphical models [Koller and Friedman, 2009,
Pearl, 1988] express a distribution over world states, fac-
tored across a product space of random variables. The
defining feature of such models is their explicit represen-
tation of probabilistic dependence in terms of graph struc-
ture.2 Formally, a Bayesian network is an annotated di-
rected acyclic graph, comprising:
1. nodes {X1, . . . , Xn} representing n random vari-
ables,
2. directed edges between nodes, with Pa(X) denoting
the parents of X: nodes with a directed edge to X ,
and
3. a conditional probability function Pr(Xi | Pa(Xi))
1Throughout we adopt notation for discrete probability and fi-
nite summations, and ask the reader to recognize that the funda-
mental concepts generalize to density functions and integrals.
2See the cited references for tutorial and in-depth treatments.
associated with each node i = 1, . . . , n.
The graph structure encodes the pattern of conditional in-
dependence relations that follow from the fundamental as-
sumption that each random variable is conditionally inde-
pendent of its non-descendants (nodes to which it has no
directed path) given its parents. Under a causal interpre-
tation of edges in the graph, the Bayes net also provides
a representation suitable for inference about decisions and
experimentation [Pearl, 2009]. From the independence se-
mantics of the graphical model, we can reconstruct the full
joint distribution as the product of conditional probabilities
directly represented:
Pr(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∏
i=1
Pr(xi | Pa(Xi)).
The factored representation affords significant benefits in
compact expression of joint probability distributions, as
well as algorithmic efficiencies in inference.
Moreover, the graph itself supports reasoning about condi-
tional independence. For instance, it follows that a node
is conditionally independent of all others given its Markov
blanket: parents, children, and parents of children. More
generally, the Bayes-net graph entails that the set of vari-
ables Y is conditionally independent of the set Y ′ given
variables in Z if and only if (iff) Z d-separates Y from Y ′
[Pearl, 1988]. Such d-separation holds when every undi-
rected path between nodes y ∈ Y and y′ ∈ Y ′ is blocked
by Z. A path is blocked by Z if it includes a node z ∈ Z
with at least one edge pointing out, or a collider node with
both edges pointing in such that neither the collider nor any
of its descendants is in Z.
2.3 Example: Interdependent Values in Auction
Games
To illustrate the use of graphical models for expressing de-
pendencies in signal structure, we present Bayes nets cap-
turing some basic patterns of interdependent values in auc-
tion games. Some classic results in auction theory [Kr-
ishna, 2010], such as Vickrey’s original analysis [Vickrey,
1961], assume independent private values (IPV): that the
agents’ types (valuations for a good under auction in this
setting) are probabilistically independent. Auction theory
recognizes, however, that in general, an agent’s value for a
good may depend on others’ valuations. For example, the
valuation of an expert (e.g., if the good is fine art or an-
tique furniture) could sway the value of others, because it
provides evidence about fundamental shared values in au-
thenticity, craftsmanship, and other uncertain features of
the good. This has direct implications for bidding strategy,
in three ways. First, in an auction where information is re-
vealed over time (e.g., the ascending open outcry), an agent
should interpret the observed bidding behavior of others as
evidence about their valuations. Second, the agent should
anticipate the effect of its own bid on information revealed
to others. Third, even when no information is revealed
(e.g., in a sealed-bid auction), the others’ bids will reflect
their valuations, hence the agent should consider how the
auction result conditional on those bids influences the prob-
ability and expected value of winning.
One standard model of interdependent values posits an un-
derlying state variable, ω, which bears on every agent’s val-
uation (in the antiques example, ω might represent authen-
ticity or craftsmanship). To model the fact that an agent i
has only partial information about its own valuation (leav-
ing room for the influence of others), we define the agent’s
private information, si, as a signal that depends probabilis-
tically on its valuation. Figure 1(a) depicts this situation as
a Bayesian network. The dependence of vi on vj , j 6= i, is
represented by the undirected path between these variables
through ω. Node ω blocks this sole path, thus by the se-
mantics of Bayesian networks, the model also entails that
vi and vj are conditionally independent given ω. By the
same logic, the agents’ signals are also marginally depen-
dent but conditionally independent.
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Figure 1: Interdependent values over N agents, expressed
in Bayesian network structures. We distinguish agent i’s
private information (signal), si, from its valuation, vi.
(a) Standard model, where interdependencies are captured
in a hidden state variable, ω. (b) Independent private val-
ues expressed in this framework. (c) Common values as a
special case of the interdependent value model. (d) Signals
as cause rather than observed effect of value.
For comparison, Figure 1(b) presents the IPV model using
this graphical notation. Since the expected value of vi is in-
dependent of sj , j 6= i, the signal si is a sufficient statistic,
and assuming risk neutral preferences, we take E[vi | si]
as agent i’s valuation. At the other extreme, we can also
express the common value model, Figure 1(c), where every
agent has the same valuation, ∀i.vi = v, but observes an
independent signal conditional on that value. In this case,
the underlying state variable ω is superfluous, as the inter-
dependence can be captured in terms of v.
The model of Figure 1(d) reverses the direction of ar-
rows between values and signals compared to our standard
model (a). In this structure, we interpret the signals as fac-
tors causing or determining the value, rather than as ob-
served effects of these values as in the other models. For
example, there may be common uncertain factors (repre-
sented by ω0) relevant to all agents’ value, and each makes
an observation about a feature of interest only to them. In
terms of the Bayesian network, the paths between si remain
blocked by ω0, but are now unblocked by the vi, since these
are collider nodes with both arrows pointing in. Hence in
model (d) the signals si are marginally independent, but
conditionally dependent given the values vi, yet still ren-
dered conditionally independent given ω0.
These differences in dependence structure have signifi-
cant implications for how agents should reason about their
own value given information reflecting the other agents’
values—such as observations of their bids or indirect ev-
idence about their bids from the resolution of who wins
the auction. In model (a), the agent cares about other-
agent signals because they influence their bids (hence the
agent’s own probability of winning with its own bid), and
also because they are evidence for the underlying state ω.
In model (d), the other-agent signals provide no relevant in-
formation about the underlying state or agent’s own value.
To see this, we consider a generic form of bidding game,
where agent i’s bid bi(si) is a function of its signal. Its
payoff (utility), ui, is a function of its value, and of the bids
of all the agents.
Definition 1. A utility function ui(vi, bi, b−i) is value-
action separable if it can be expressed in the form
ui(vi, bi, b−i) = f(vi, bi)g(bi, b−i) + h(bi, b−i),
for some functions f , g, and h.
Note that payoff functions for standard auction games are
decomposable in this way (as are many other games anal-
ogously), with function g determining the auction winner
(good allocation), and h the associated payment. For ex-
ample, the first-price sealed-bid auction has f(vi, bi) = vi,
g(bi, b−i) = 1|{j|bj=bi}| if bi = maxj bj , zero otherwise,
and h(bi, b−i) = big(bi, b−i).
Theorem 1. For a game with value-action separable pay-
off functions, the signal model of Figure 1(d) is strategically
equivalent to the IPV case (b).
Proof: The objective of each agent is to choose bi(si) so
as to maximize expected utility, given other-agent bidding
strategies.
Eω0,s−i|si [f(vi, bi)g(bi, b−i) + h(bi, b−i)]
Since bi(si) is agent i’s choice, by d-separation of vi from
s−i we have that (vi, bi) and (bi, b−i) are conditionally in-
dependent given si. Accounting for this and other indepen-
dence, the expectation can be decomposed as
Eω0 [f(vi, bi)]Es−i [g(bi, b−i)] + Es−i [h(bi, b−i)].
Since ω0 affects only the term for agent i, we can marginal-
ize it out and obtain the same problem faced by an agent
under the IPV model.
The standard auction-theoretic treatment identifies the sig-
nal si with vi | si, the agent’s value conditional on sig-
nal. This is convenient since it associates the private infor-
mation directly with payoff conditional on winning. It is
also without loss of generality, in that the only relevance of
the signal in these auction settings is its relation to value.
This treatment does entail loss of structural information,
however, as once we marginalize the si, the model of Fig-
ure 1(a) is indistinguishable from model (d). As argued
above, this sacrifices a potential opportunity to exploit in-
dependence of signals to simplify the characterization of
bidding strategy.
Observation 2. Independence of value from other-agent
signals may hold even given interdependent values, signif-
icantly broadening the conditions where IPV-like bidding
strategies can be applied.
3 The Origin of Signals
3.1 Generated and Interpreted Signals
Hong and Page [2009] distinguish between interpreted and
generated signals. The distinction hinges on the relation of
signals to a focal variable, v, which we refer to as the vari-
able of interest or outcome. In some cases there may be in-
dividual outcome variables for each agent, v1, . . . , vN . The
letter “v” evokes the value variable in our auction example
(§2.3), but this is just one special case.
Generated signals are often motivated in terms of impre-
cise measurements or distortions of an outcome variable v.
The example of Figure 1(a) is an instance of generated sig-
nals. A generated signal is characterized by its distribution
conditional on the variable of interest, Pr(s | v). When
signals for respective agents are conditionally independent
given outcomes (or individualized outcomes), we have for
all i, Pr(si | vi, s−i) = Pr(si | vi), which is exactly the in-
formation required by the Bayes net representation of Fig-
ure 1(a).
Interpreted signals are defined by Hong and Page [2009] to
produce predictions about outcomes, based on interpreta-
tions of partial observations of the underlying state. At a
coarse grain, the interpreted signal scheme is represented
by the Bayes net of Figure 2(a). A key distinction from the
generated-signal model is that whereas the signals may be
conditionally independent given ω, they are not structurally
separated by the outcome variable v. This means that if we
attempt to transform the graph so that the distribution of
si is expressed in the form of a conditional on v (e.g., by
marginalizing the ω variable), as in generated models, we
would introduce direct probabilistic dependencies among
the signals.
The more detailed framework for interpreted signals devel-
oped by Hong and Page [2009] is presented in Figure 2(b).
Although the original work did not employ Bayes nets, we
describe here how the graphical modeling formalism nat-
urally captures the structural assumptions defined by that
scheme.
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Figure 2: (a) Basic pattern of interpreted signals. (b) Struc-
tured framework for interpreted signals presented by Hong
and Page [2009].
Interpreted signals in this framework require that the out-
come variable depends deterministically on the underlying
state. This is expressed in the Bayes net picture by the dou-
ble circle employed for the node v. The private informa-
tion or interpretation pii of agent i is also a deterministic
function of underlying state, which entails that the possible
signals define a partition over these states. Since these rela-
tions are deterministic, we use v(ω) to denote the value of
outcome variable v given state ω, and similarly pii(ω) for
the interpretation of agent i given that state.
Given its interpretation, agent i forms a prediction φi of the
outcome variable by selecting its most likely value:
φi(pii) = arg max
v
∑
v(ω)=v∧pii(ω)=pii
Pr(ω).
We can also define predictions as functions of underlying
state, φi(ω) ≡ φi(pii(ω)).
A further hallmark of the interpreted framework is its ap-
peal to a representation of the state in terms of attribute or
feature vectors. Interpreted signals are based on observing
a subset of attributes. For example, an interpreted signal
for the value of a car might comprise the age, mileage, type,
and condition of the car. A particular realization of this sig-
nal (i.e., the interpretation) corresponds to an equivalence
class of possible cars that share the same attribute values.
The agent’s prediction for car value (the outcome) is that
value maximizing total probability of cars consistent with
both the value and the signaled attributes. This prediction is
imperfect to the extent the interpretation does not consider
all relevant attributes.
An attribute-based representation renders even more com-
pelling the expression of dependence structure using graph-
ical models. All we need to accommodate this structure is
to replace the ω node in the models depicted above with a
set of nodes {X1, . . . , XK} representing the respective at-
tributes. We then add edges among these nodes to express
probabilistic dependencies among these attributes.
Thus we see that Bayes nets can express both patterns of
signals—generated and interpreted—and that the graphical
structure itself reveals which pattern holds sway.
Observation 3. Graphical dependence structure captures
the central difference between the patterns of generated
and interpreted signals, as defined by Hong and Page
[2009].
In typical applications, generated signals are assumed ei-
ther to be independent or independent conditional on out-
come. For instance, in the generated-signal model of Fig-
ure 1(a), signals are conditionally independent given value.
That is not the case for interpreted signals. This too is im-
mediately apparent from inspection of the interpreted sig-
nal structure of Figure 2(a), or 2(b). The outcome variable
does not d-separate (see §2.2) the signals (interpretations)
in these models, and thus we should not expect conditional
independence. Though the lack of d-separation does not
necessarily entail actual dependence, in fact, for the case of
binary signals Hong and Page [2009] show that dependence
is almost inevitable. Formally, they show that there exists
a unique outcome function, up to isomorphism, for con-
ditionally independent interpreted signals, and even more
limiting, that for that function, each of the signals must see
each attribute but one, and the missing attribute must differ
for each signal. This is a very unrealistic case.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that the point of distinguish-
ing interpreted from generated is not to argue for one model
of signals over the other. To the contrary, there are classes
of natural situations best rendered in terms of generated
signals, and others better modeled as interpreted. More-
over, the flexible graphical representation suggests the pos-
sibility of hybrid cases, where private information includes
combinations of generated and interpreted signals.
3.2 Independence of Interpretations
The attribute representation of state facilitates reasoning
about dependence across interpretations. The interpreta-
tions of agents i and j are independent, if for all values of pii
and pij , Pr(pii, pij) = Pr(pii) Pr(pij). Such independence
implies that knowing one agent’s interpretation provides
no information about the other’s: Pr(pij | pii) = Pr(pij).
From the Bayes net of Figure 2(b), we see that predic-
tions are d-separated iff their associated interpretations are
as well. Given the graph structure, independence of inter-
pretations entails independence of predictions. The con-
verse does not hold, however, as it is possible to construct
scenarios where predictions turn out to be statistically inde-
pendent even when interpretations interdepend [Hong and
Page, 2009].
Using the graphical model formalism, we can characterize
independence of interpretations directly in terms of inde-
pendence among the attributes on which these interpreta-
tions are based. Figure 3(a) depicts the situation where N
agents have independent interpretations, because the state
is factored into N independent variables representing the
attributes observed by the respective agents. This captures
the argument by Hong and Page [2009] that a product-
space representation of state is the only way to support
interpretation independence. It also follows that mutual
independence of nontrivial interpretations is possible only
for a state space sufficiently rich to be factored N ways:
|Ω| ≥ 2N .
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Figure 3: (a) Unconditionally independent interpretations.
(b) Dependencies of prediction correctness even for inde-
pendent predictions.
Observation 4. The attribute-based perspective of inter-
preted signals is directly reflected in graphical model struc-
ture, which supports reasoning about interpretation inde-
pendence.
3.3 Correctness of Predictions
The prediction associated with an interpreted signal is cor-
rect if it coincides with the outcome that is actually the
case. We can express correctness in another random vari-
able, δ, also a function of underlying state:
δ (ω) =
{
1 (correct) if φ(ω) = v(ω),
0 (incorrect) otherwise.
The accuracy of an interpreted signal φ can then be de-
fined as the probability of its associated δ taking value 1.
We say that two predictions are independently correct if
knowing that one agent’s prediction about the outcome is
correct gives no information about whether the other’s pre-
diction is correct. From Figure 3(b), it is clear that the cor-
rectness of predictions is dependent (by virtue of the path
through v), even if the predictions themselves are indepen-
dent. This structural dependence bears out another result
of Hong and Page [2009]. For binary signals, they show
that independent and informative (probability of correct-
ness greater than 1/2) predictions that predict two outcomes
with equal probability are negatively correlated in their cor-
rectness.
4 Signal Structure in Prediction Markets
The previous section showed that the distinction between
generated and interpreted signals manifests in qualitatively
different belief patterns (e.g., dependence in prediction ac-
curacy), and thus may entail significant implications for
strategic behavior. These distinctions are well captured by
Bayesian networks, a property also noted in the example of
interdependent value in auctions (§2.3), which also illus-
trates strategic implications of independence structure.
In this section we examine another scenario, about bluffing
behavior in prediction markets. We use graphical models
to explicate the results of Chen et al. [2010], which provide
another example of strategic behavior hinging qualitatively
on signal dependence structure. The authors consider the
behavior of bettors in a prediction market based on a mar-
ket scoring rule [Hanson, 2003]. The mechanism maintains
a current probability distribution (suitably initialized). Par-
ticipating agents may then change the distribution to one
they specify, and receive a payoff based on their chosen
change and the outcome of some uncertain event. The pay-
off is calculated using a proper scoring rule, which means
that the agent with only one opportunity to bet optimizes
its expected payoff by specifying its true probability distri-
bution. The strategic question raised by Chen et al. [2010]
is whether truthful reporting remains optimal when agents
have the opportunity to make multiple bets over alternat-
ing rounds. The potential is opened for bluffing, where an
agent misreports its probability initially, perhaps to mislead
the others and capitalize in a later round.
The question is interesting only if the agents’ signals are
informative, in which case they must all be related to the
outcome variable of interest. Chen et al. [2010] explore
two basic signal structures, illustrated for the case of two
agents in Figure 4. The first (a) is an instance of the gener-
ated signals model—signals are dependent, but condition-
ally independent given the outcome variable. In the sec-
ond (b), signals are unconditionally independent, but de-
pendent conditional on the outcome. Like the interpreted
model, signals are viewed more as causes than effects of
the variable of interest.
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Figure 4: Signal structures for betting in prediction mar-
kets. (a) Conditionally independent signals. (b) Uncondi-
tionally independent but conditionally dependent signals.
The main result of Chen et al. [2010] is that truthful bidding
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium given the generated sig-
nals model of Figure 4(a). That is, bluffing is not profitable
given that signal structure. For unconditionally indepen-
dent signals, however, truthful behavior is not in equilib-
rium, and bluffing can be profitable. By way of intuitive
explanation, the authors show that for this mechanism un-
der model (b), the signals are complements: the expected
profit for knowing both signals is greater than the sum of
expected profits from each individually. If bets are truth-
ful, the agent who bets second effectively gets to observe
both signals. This can explain why complementarity of sig-
nals motivates bluffing. Under the generated model (a), in
contrast, signals are substitutes (independent draws condi-
tional on true outcome), and hence it is more important to
get the benefit of the first signal than to hold out to exploit
the combination.
5 Qualitative Reasoning
The idea of qualitative probabilistic reasoning [Parsons,
2001] is to capture high-level relationships among uncer-
tain variables at an appropriate level of abstraction, rely-
ing on precise assessments of probability values only when
strictly necessary for the purpose at hand. Qualitative rela-
tionships typically correspond to basic causal information,
such as “a positively influences b”. These relationships
may also be expressed conditionally, and capture higher-
order relationships, such as “a and b are synergistic in their
influence on c”.3 Such relationships tend to be quite ro-
bust, insensitive to the precise measurement scale of the
variables, and often to which details are included or not in-
cluded in a model. They are easier to elicit than precise nu-
meric relationships, because they focus on causal structure
and relative judgments, whereas assessing absolute quali-
tative measures generally requires an exhaustive consider-
ation of contributing factors. Moreover, qualitative models
admit efficient inference algorithms based on sign propaga-
tion, in contrast to the worst-case exponential calculations
required for exact numeric queries.
The qualitative probabilistic network (QPN) formalism
[Wellman, 1990] captures basic influence and synergy re-
lationships, described informally above,4 and were shown
to capture important patterns of reasoning, such as trade-
off formulation, “explaining away” [Wellman and Hen-
rion, 1993], and other intercausal patterns [Lucas, 2005].
Druzdzel and Henrion [1993] developed computationally
efficient inference algorithms based on qualitative belief
propagation. Vanderweele and Robins [2009] show how
qualitative relations can be used for causal assessment of
statistical tests. Additional research has extended QPNs in
3Conditional independence may itself be viewed as a kind of
qualitative relation, and in that sense the annotations discussed
here are a natural extension to graphical model representations.
4See cited references for precise technical definitions in terms
of probabilistic inequalities.
various ways, to improve expressive power [Renooij et al.,
2002] and provide some basis for tradeoff resolution [Liu
and Wellman, 1998, Renooij and van der Gaag, 1999].
Qualitative probabilistic relations capture essential distinc-
tions in the economic analysis of signals. Indeed, the con-
cept of positive probabilistic influence in QPNs is based
on the same monotone likelihood-ratio property employed
by Milgrom [1981] to categorize signals as “good news”
or “bad news”. Similarly, the synergy relations defined
by QPNs are related to qualitative properties used by
economists in various domains (auctions, oligopoly, sig-
naling games) to establish that specified game classes have
equilibria in (pure) monotone threshold strategies [Athey,
2001, Milgrom and Shannon, 1994].
We illustrate the use of qualitative reasoning for games
of incomplete information with a simple auction exam-
ple. Figure 5 presents a QPN5 for a single-item first-price
sealed-bid (FPSB) auction with two bidders. The left side
of the diagram is exactly the generated signal model of
interdependent values (Figure 1(a)), augmented with “+”
signs indicating the direction of probabilistic relations. In-
tuitively, the edge ω →+ vi says that value is positively
related to the underlying state (this requires that the state
variable have some ordered scale), and vi →+ si that the
signal si is likely to be higher for higher vi values. The
positive path between the two signals (influences combine
by sign multiplication) means they are affiliated [Milgrom
and Weber, 1982], which is the fundamental assumption
guiding many results in the theory of auctions with interde-
pendent value [Krishna, 2010, Milgrom, 2003].
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Figure 5: Qualitative probabilistic model of a two-bidder
FPSB auction with interdependent values.
The remaining variables represent:
• the bid bi, drawn in squares to indicate decision nodes,
• the “winner” w, based on comparing the bids, and
• the utility values ui, drawn in diamonds to indicate
value nodes.
The dashed arrow from si to bi indicates that agent i knows
the value of si (i.e., has observed the signal) at the time
5Technically since there are multiple agents we should call this
a qualitative MAID [Koller and Milch, 2003].
it decides its bid. For current purposes we take the per-
spective of agent 1, and interpret the variable w as true
iff agent 1 wins (i.e., b1 > b2, or with probability 0.5 if
b1 = b2.) Under the convention true > false , there is a
positive probabilistic influence from b1 to w, and a nega-
tive influence from b2 to w. The utility for agent i is vi− bi
if it wins, zero otherwise, hence vi is a positive influence
on ui and bi negative. The influence of w is ambiguous,
given the uncertainty about whether vi ≥ bi.6
The last key element of the qualitative model is indicated
by an arc connecting the influences of vi and w on ui. This
notation represents the positive qualitative synergy (a prob-
abilistic form of superadditivity [Wellman, 1990]) among
these variables. Intuitively, value is synergistic with win-
ning on utility because the effect of an increase in value is
greater when the agent wins (in this case trivially, as value
has no influence if the agent loses).
From the qualitative relations specified, we can infer an im-
portant (and well known) fact about agent strategy: that
an agent’s optimal bid is monotone increasing in its sig-
nal. This follows from the monotone policy implications
of positive synergy between the bid and signal. We infer
this in turn from (1) the positive path from signal to value,
(2) the positive path from bid to win, and (3) given synergy
of value and win. This inference is not affected by the in-
terdependent values, and would go through as well in the
IPV model with the state variable ω omitted.
What does rely on interdependent value is the inference we
can make about the influence of winning on value.
Definition 2 (Winner’s Curse). An auction model exhibits
winner’s curse if the event of winning has a negative quali-
tative probabilistic influence on the agent’s value.
We incorporate the monotone policy conclusion above by
representing b2 (from agent 1’s perspective) as a random
variable with positive influence from s2. With this modifi-
cation of the model, we find a negative path fromw through
b2 to v1. This means that for any chosen bid b1, the event of
winning is bad news about the good’s value. Thus the infa-
mous winner’s curse is here explicated through a graphical
model with qualitative annotations.
Since bid b1 is synergistic with value v1 (same inference
as for the signal, but more direct), the winner’s curse is
a reason to bid lower in FSPB auctions. Eliminating the
underlying state ω in this case would break the inference
path; winning is no curse in the IPV model. It follows that
the interdependence of value lowers bids in FPSB, all else
equal.
Theorem 5. The QPN model of FPSB (Figure 5) entails
6The extension of QPNs to allow context-specific signs
[Renooij et al., 2002] would support more precise inference in
this case, since the influence of w is disambiguated by the other
predecessors of ui.
monotone bidding strategy, winner’s curse, and the reduc-
tion of bids to compensate for winner’s curse.
Proof: The results follow from standard QPN definitions
and inference rules [Druzdzel and Henrion, 1993, Well-
man, 1990], as sketched above.
Note that the reasoning above goes through as long as the
signals are affiliated (have a net positive path in the qualita-
tive model), and also positively related to value. The con-
clusions about winner’s curse do not depend on this spe-
cific generated-signals model. We can construct instances
of interpreted-signal patterns, for example, where the sig-
nals are not mutually affiliated with value, but are mutually
affiliated with each other and positively related to value.7
Observation 6. Winner’s curse properties (and other re-
sults of interest) can be established from interpreted signal
patterns, not covered by the standard theorems.
Through this sort of analysis it appears possible to general-
ize many existing auction-theoretic characterizations from
the literature, using an expanded repertoire of qualitative
and structural conditions.
A QPN model of the second-price sealed-bid (SPSB) auc-
tion would be similar to Figure 5: we need only replace
the bi → ui edges with edges pointing to the other agent’s
utility node, bi → u−i. The inferences relating signals
to bids and winner’s curse stay valid, though the implica-
tions of winner’s curse are quite different. The event of
winning is still bad news for value under SPSB, but a low
other-agent bid is also good news for utility, as it lowers
the price the winner pays. Which influence holds sway de-
pends on the particulars. We have constructed an example
[Wellman, forthcoming] where a bidder with a high signal
in SPSB auctions bids higher given interdependent values
than it would with independent values, and a bidder with a
low signal bids lower.
6 Conclusion
Graphical models provide a language for describing and
reasoning about the qualitative structure of a decision or
game situation, including the private signals on which
agents base their decisions. By explicating the pattern of
signals, we gain insights about abstract properties of these
games. In this paper we have identified some such proper-
ties reflected directly in graphical structure. In particular,
we have shown how the framework of interpreted signals
developed by Hong and Page [2009] can be recast in terms
of distinctions on graphical structure, and argue that this
representation facilitates reasoning about its implications.
The perspective also captures pivotal distinctions in strate-
gic analysis of prediction markets, and auctions. Qualita-
tive models of auction games that augment independence
7See Appendix A.
structure with monotonicity relationships capture impor-
tant patterns of reasoning in these domains, and suggest
generalizations on known results.
Graphical models may also be used more concretely, for
solving instances of incomplete-information games spec-
ified using this formalism. If we augment the directed
graph with specifications of precise conditional probabil-
ities at each node, we have a complete Bayesian network
representation, and can employ techniques from a rich al-
gorithmic toolkit for answering queries about probabilis-
tic relationships in the model [Koller and Friedman, 2009].
Extensions to include decisions and utilities of multiple
agents yield a graphical model of a game situation. Koller
and Milch [2003] call this extended model form a mul-
tiagent influence diagram (MAID) and show how to uti-
lize both graphical model and game-solving computational
techniques for inference in the MAID representation. Gal
and Pfeffer [2008] extend the possibilities even further,
with their network-of-influence-diagram (NID) representa-
tion. NIDs provide a straightforward way to express that
agents may have differing views of the game, by defining
each agent’s view of the game as its own MAID.
In future work, we plan to develop canonical Bayes-net
model structures for signal patterns, expressed as build-
ing blocks within MAIDs or NIDs, thus facilitating more
widespread use of these models for analyzing incomplete-
information games. Another promising direction is to ex-
plore models that endogenize signals, by explicitly rep-
resenting the decision to observe outcome-relevant at-
tributes. We anticipate that understanding qualitative re-
lations among signal attributes will be essential for charac-
terizing the form of optimal observation policies.
A Example: Affiliation with Interpreted
Signals
The seminal paper by Milgrom and Weber [1982] estab-
lished several auction-theoretic results under the assump-
tion of affiliation: essentially, that the higher one agent’s
signals, the more likely that other agents’ signals and val-
ues are to be higher as well.
We demonstrate by example that the affiliation require-
ments of interpreted signals may be more flexible than
the standard generated signal model. Let there be
two bidders and a common value object. The com-
mon value, denoted by v, can take two possible val-
ues, 0 or 1. Prior to bidding, each agent gets a sig-
nal si ∈ {0, 1}. The joint distribution of signals and
the value is described as follows. Each of the configu-
rations (s1, s2; v): (0, 0; 0), (1, 0; 1), (0, 1; 1)(1, 1; 1) has
probability 0.25, and the remaining combinations have zero
probability. Notice that Pr(0, 0; 1)·Pr(1, 1; 1) = 0 < 116 =
Pr(1, 0; 1)·Pr(0, 1; 1). This construction therefore violates
affiliation. (Another way to see this is that the signals are
negatively correlated given v = 1.)
If we treat the signals as interpreted, however, then it be-
comes clear that the signals themselves are uncondition-
ally affiliated. To show this we first write the relationship
between signals and the common value given by the joint
probability distribution of signals using an outcome func-
tion that depends on two attributes x1 and x2 :
v = f(x1, x2) = x1 + x2 − x1x2,
where xi can either be 0 or 1 with equal probability and x1
and x2 are independent. Prior to bidding, bidder i observes
the signal si = xi and bids accordingly.
Since s1 and s2 are independent, they are trivially affili-
ated. A qualitative model incorporating this situation for
a common-value FPSB is depicted in Figure 6. The con-
clusions about FPSB strategy stated as Theorem 5 likewise
follow for this configuration, by the same series of infer-
ences applied there. Affiliation of signals in conjunction
with the positive relation between signals and value is also
enough to establish the results about SPSB equilibrium re-
ported by Milgrom and Weber [1982].
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Figure 6: Qualitative probabilistic model of a two-bidder
FPSB auction with common values and interpreted signals.
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